The process of risk management for institutional investors faces two challenges. First, since most institutions are decentralized as opposed to being direct investors in assets, it is difficult to separate the risks of the assets in the portfolio from the risks generated by the investment decisions by the fund management to construct the portfolio. To address this issue, we propose a risk measurement methodology which calculates the risk contributions of individual securities and investment decisions simultaneously. This decomposition is applicable to any decentralized investor as long as its relevant risk measurement statistic can be additively decomposed. Second, statistics used to measure risk may not coincide with institution-specific investment risks, in the sense that the utility employed in asset allocation may be unrelated to the risk measure utilized. For example, an institution may do meanvariance asset allocation, but inconsistently measure the risk of the portfolio using Value at Risk. We apply this methodology to a particular type of decentralized investor, specifically, endowment funds where the relevant risk statistic is the downside risk of returns relative to actual payout levels, plus inflation. We show how downside risk can be decomposed and apply our simultaneous downside risk decomposition empirically on a sample of U.S. endowment funds. We find that an endowment's asset allocation to U.S. Equity, consistent with having the largest weight in the average endowment portfolio, generates about 50% of total endowment returns but almost 100% of total portfolio downside risk. We further find that tactical allocations (or timing) have economically small contributions to both returns and risk. Finally, we find that the allocations to U.S. Fixed Income and to Hedge Funds as well as active investment decisions (except for tactical) contribute positively to returns, while reducing portfolio downside risk. The risk contributions are sensitive to changes in payout levels and an increase in the latter may offset the risk reducing power of active investing.
In the context of recent financial meltdowns, the need for institutions to bolster their risk management capabilities has never been greater. Recently, the Federal Reserve Chairman declared that "improvements in banks' risk management will provide a more stable financial system by making firms more resilient to shocks". 1 Recently, however, we learned that many financial institutions were considerably riskier than previously thought and witnessed in the wake of catastrophic market conditions their devastating and costly collapse. Whereas market risk cannot be controlled, the decision to take on this risk can be. Thus, the following question arises: has the overall risk of these institutions increased because the markets in which they were invested became riskier, or because the institutions knowingly chose to invest in these markets? As the latter risks can be managed, answering this question means identifying at which point in the investment process of a decentralized, complex organization, decisions were taken that led to significant changes in the overall risk of the institution. This paper's aim is to propose a methodology that provides such an answer.
Since our methodology is specifically designed for decentralized, or "top-down" investors, it is applicable to many types of institutions such as mutual and hedge funds, funds of funds, pension funds, endowments and foundations.
In decentralized organizations, the portfolio of the institution is a sum of not only the individual securities but also of the investment decisions made by fund management to construct the portfolio. We often find that in stratified investment structures, the interests of the investment staff are not aligned. There may be discrepancies between the utility function of the Chief Investment Officer (CIO) and the utility functions of investment staff of the fund, who are responsible for the implementation of the investment decisions of the CIO. The result is that the management structure itself adds to the overall risk of a portfolio.
For example, a U.S. Equity manager may decide to invest in a 130-30 fund in order to enhance her adjusted returns. This manager may be what Leibowitz (2005) calls a "beta grazer":
by making the decision to invest in a hedge fund-like product, the manager adds an active component to her portfolio that will be correlated with an index representative of hedge funds. This investment decision may thus reduce the diversification effect between hedge funds and U.S. Equity, and shift the overall risk of the portfolio away from what the CIO may consider optimal.
2 Although the U.S. Equity manager may find the 130-30 investment appropriate for her portfolio, the CIO's utility function may dictate a higher level of portfolio risk and a lower overall exposure to hedge funds. In order to capture such potentially risky behavior, the risk management methodology proposed in this study simultaneously addresses the risks contributed by investment decisions as well as by individual securities. We refer to this risk measurement methodology as simultaneous risk decomposition.
Utility discrepancies do not stem only from the multilayered nature of investment management, but also from the way risk is measured. In particular, the risk statistics traditionally used to measure risk may not relate to the utility function of the CIO. For example, the main cause of concern for an investor facing a liability -and the most significant source of risk -is that returns will fall short of the fund's required payout. In contrast, risk is traditionally measured as Value at Risk, standard deviation, etc., and these risk measures do not explicitly incorporate an investor's payout obligation in their calculation. In this paper we develop a risk measurement methodology which suits an investor facing a liability. We consider that the relevant risk statistic in this case is the downside risk of the portfolio relative to a minimal acceptable return 3 . There are several reasons that we focus on this particular risk statistic. First, it is a measure of risk appropriate for many types of investors: pension funds facing a liability, university endowments required to meet a payout, hedge funds which have a watermark, mutual funds attempting to outperform a benchmark, or simply funds seeking to preserve their value. Second, asymmetry in the returns of asset classes such as hedge funds require appropriate risk measures. Third, several large university endowments and pension plans now consider downside risk as an alternative to standard deviation in their asset allocation process, which traditionally was a mean-variance framework. To avoid a discrepancy between their utility function (which is of mean-downside risk type), these institutions also need to use downside deviation as a risk measure. However, risk decomposition methodologies are nonexistent for downside risk. For these reasons we propose a risk management methodology based on downside risk.
To illustrate empirically, we apply our simultaneous risk decomposition methodology to portfolios of actual U.S. endowment funds from the 2005 National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO). Consistent with our understanding that most endowments are traditional investors, holding about 43% of their portfolio in U.S. Equity, we find that the long term allocation to this asset class generates most of the returns and downside risk. Our findings further indicate that the allocation to U.S. Equity generates only about 45% of a typical endowment's portfolio returns, but 94% of the portfolio downside risk. It is the long term allocation to U.S. Fixed Income and to alternative asset classes such as Hedge Funds that reduce the downside risk of the portfolio, while at the same time contributing positively to the overall return.
The risk reduction effect of Hedge Funds is a surprising finding of our analysis. An endowment fund's average allocation to hedge funds is 11.23%, which is about half of that to U.S. Fixed Income (the average allocation to fixed income is 19.95%). Each asset class contributes to returns in equal proportions (about 15%) and reduces risk (by as much as 8% in the case of Hedge Funds). This finding debunks the somewhat traditional belief that hedge funds are high-risk assets. In a similar vein, we find that the active component of an endowment's portfolio reduces overall downside risk. This evidence is suggestive of good security selection skills of university endowment managers.
Furthermore, we study the sensitivity of our risk decomposition to the payout level. We find that varying the payout level has the potential of changing not only the magnitude of the risk contributions of investment decisions and portfolio holdings, but also our conclusions about whether those portfolio components add to overall risk or reduce it. For example, holding cash reduces the overall downside risk of the portfolio if the payout level is low.
However, for higher payout levels, holding cash increases the difficulty of achieving the required payout level. Thus, cash adds to the overall risk of the portfolio. This example illustrates how risk management can give different answers when different risk statistics are applied, and highlights the importance of customizing the ways in which investors measure risk. Another important finding from our our analysis is that the risk reducing power of active management disappears as payout levels increase. Typically endowment payouts are a fixed proportion of the moving average of the fund value. Therefore, as returns fall payout ratios for these institutions will rise and =active investing, which does not contribute significantly to performance in the first place, will in addition no longer reduce portfolio risk. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the risk methodology we propose, consisting of the simultaneous decomposition of risk across investment decisions as well as individual securities. Section 3 presents the mathematics of the downside risk decomposition. Section 4 applies this methodology to endowments from the NACUBO database. Section 5 concludes.
Decentralized Portfolio Decomposition
In an attempt to generate additional performance, either by market timing or by security selection, the CIO of an investment company such as a pension fund, university endowment, hedge fund or mutual fund would typically delegate the responsibility to invest in various asset classes to managers who specialize in those respective asset classes. Consequently, there are multiple steps by which the portfolio of the institution is constructed, i.e., the institution is decentralized as described in van Binsbergen et al. (2008) . In such funds, a Board together with senior fund management allocate the portfolio to a variety of asset classes on an infrequent basis. After agreeing upon these broad investment directions with the Board, senior management of the endowment has the ability to adjust the actual portfolio away from the broad, long term allocations. This reallocation may be the result of an active decision to time the markets or a result of specific market conditions which may make it difficult to rebalance the weights of less liquid asset classes. Asset class managers who report to the CIO then implement these decisions within their respective asset class. These managers either select securities directly or invest through external or internal managers. In the latter case, the asset class managers specify the benchmarks against which the performance of the external managers in their portfolio is judged. These benchmarks may not be identical to the indices that are representative of the broad asset class in which they are invested. Thus several strata of decentralization emerge. First, the CIO may allocate the portfolio in a manner that does not maximize the utility of the Board. Second, the asset class managers may choose to invest differently from their asset class benchmarks, either through external managers or though direct holdings. Finally, the external managers may depart from the benchmarks against which they are evaluated. These levels of decentralization have the potential to reduce the utility function of the Board and it is important to identify which strata, and/or what securities increase or decrease the risk of the portfolio relative to the case where the institution is centrally managed.
In the following section we model the typical "top-down" portfolio structure that characterizes decentralized investors and decompose the portfolio relative to both decision strata and individual securities simultaneously.
The general case
A portfolio is usually thought of as a combination of securities. As explained above, we expand this definition by adding that a portfolio is also a combination of investment decisions that determine the weights of the securities.
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In a "top-down" organization, these weights are the result of a stratified investment decision process. Thus, we start the decomposition by recognizing that the portfolio is a sum of the returns of the portfolios generated by each investment management stratum. Thus, for a portfolio with returns P we write: 
We refer to this as to the asset decomposition of our portfolio returns. Here, "asset" refers to the asset weights w k i , i = 1, ..., n k that are obtained at the same investment management level within the organization.
It is important to note the fundamental difference between the investment decision and the asset decompositions. While the former decomposes the portfolio along the structure of the organization, which needs not be optimal, is usually given and in most cases cannot be modified, the latter decomposes portfolios constructed by maximizing the utility functions of the investment decision maker at each investment stratum. At any given level of the investment management structure, these portfolios may be changed by the investment manager responsible for their construction. The act of modifying these portfolios in order to satisfy various risk considerations represents active risk management.
Summing the returns from the investment decision strata (the investment decision decomposition in different columns) with the returns of the portfolios within the strata (the asset decomposition in different rows), the return of the portfolio can be written as
This type of return decomposition has precedent. For example, similar to our investment decision decomposition, Daniel et al. (1997) decompose the returns of a portfolio according to whether they were generated by passive, long term investing, market timing or security selection. Brinson et al.(1986) and Blake et al. (1999) propose a similar decomposition for pension plans. As it is the case with our asset decomposition, other authors (see Pearson (2002) ) decompose portfolio risk into the risk contributions of individual securities. Our approach is novel, however, as it performs the two distinct decompositions (investment decision and asset) simultaneously. As a convention, in tables throughout this paper we shall present the asset decomposition across rows while presenting the investment decision decomposition down columns.
An example from endowment funds
We continue by particularizing this decomposition for the case of endowment funds, which are a perfect example of decentralized investors. The structure of such a fund is outlined graphically in Figure 1 . In the discussion which follows we describe the decision process by which an endowment fund arrives at its portfolio. 
For example, we assume that the fund XYZ, with $100 million in assets, invests in two main asset classes, U.S. Equity and Inflation Hedge (summary statistics of these asset classes' returns are presented in Table 2 ). The performance benchmark for U.S. Equity is the Russell 3000 Index, and for Inflation Hedge, the Merrill Lynch Inflation Linked Notes Index. In this first step of the investment management process, that of asset allocation, the Board of the XYZ fund agrees on a policy portfolio B characterized by the weights w P useq = 50% and w P inf link = 50%.
The Tactical Asset Allocation decision
The CIO of an endowment fund may elect to diverge from the long term allocation targets set by the Board in an attempt to "market time", or as a result of specific market conditions which may make it difficult to rebalance the weights of less liquid asset classes. That is, instead of investing w 
This expression captures the return that is achieved by over-or underweighting the policy portfolio weights in an effort to increase the returns or change the risk profile of the fund.
To exemplify, we assume that the CIO of the XYZ fund considers the long term assumptions shown in Table 2 unrealistic, as she expects equities to decline in the short term.
Consistent with her investment viewpoint, the CIO makes the tactical decision to invest w useq = 40% and w inf link = 60%. Each asset class is managed internally by an asset class manager. After the CIO determines the tactical asset allocation, the U.S. Equity manager receives $40 million to invest, while the Inflation Hedge manager receives $60 million. 
Benchmark selection decision
where for each asset class i we have that
That is, the individual weights of the securities chosen in asset class i sum to the total weight assigned to the asset class in the portfolio. A summary of the fund's portfolio is presented in Table 1 .
4. The Active (Security Selection) decision After each internal or external manager security is assigned a benchmark the responsible investment manager (whether internal or external) makes the actual investment. This investment will generate returns that differ from its benchmark. The same is true for investments in individual securities, whose returns may also be different from those of their corresponding benchmarks. This differential represents the active security selection return component in an endowment's portfolio. If the actual returns of the security j of asset class i with a portfolio weight of w i,j are r i,j , then the active or security selection contribution to the fund's returns is:
In points 1-4 we have described the decision making components D for a top-down, stratified investment process as is the case for the typical endowment fund. We refer to the decomposition of each of these components as the asset decomposition of a portfolio. The set of decision making components forming the investment decision decomposition of the fund's portfolio is represented simply by:
In this case formula (3) specializes to the following:
Alloc. Selection Alloc.
The advantage of simultaneously analyzing the investment decision as well as the asset decomposition is apparent when we measure the risk of the entire portfolio. Individual security contributions can, in fact, be correlated with the returns contributions of investment decisions. Such relationships cannot be captured unless we evaluate the risk of the portfolio whollistically.
In our example, in order to establish the effect of each of these investment decisions on the XYZ portfolio, we use historical data for the policy indices (Russell 3000 index for U.S.
Equity and the Merrill Lunch Inflation Linked Index for the Inflation Hedge), as well as for the external manager benchmarks (Merill Lynch Inflation Linked Notes Index for TIPS, the Goldman Sachs Commodities Index for commodities, the S&P 500 Index for the large cap U.S. Equity and the Russell 2000 Index for small cap U.S. Equity). For the external managers (who create the active component of the portfolio), we make the assumption that their added value (relative to the benchmarks they are assigned) are independent of each other and of the benchmarks, and log-normally distributed.
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The capital market assumptions applied to the assets of XYZ are presented in Table 2 . The return contributions of each component to the overall expected return of the fund, 11.78%, are presented in Panel A of Table 3 .
From Panel A of Table 3 we see that the largest contribution to the portfolio's return comes from the tactical decision to overweight the allocation to the Inflation Hedge asset class. At the same time the worst contributor to performance is the tactical decision to underweight U.S. Equity. Overall, however, the tactical allocation makes a positive contribution to returns (equal to -0.84% + 5.12%). This is in contrast with what we would obtain if we decompose the portfolio solely across the asset classes in which the fund is invested, namely, U.S. Equity and Inflation Hedge. In the policy portfolio of the fund, the main return generator is the U.S. Equity asset class: it generates 4.19% of the returns, while only 2.56% come from Inflation Hedge.
However, if we were to decompose the portfolio solely across asset classes and not consider investment decisions, then the main return generator would be the Inflation Hedge asset class: it generates 7.90% of the returns, as compared to only 3.88% generated by the U.S.
Equity.
Having decomposed the returns, we now turn to the decomposition of risk. We proceed with the general risk decomposition formula and illustrate numerically on the fund XYZ. 6 We use log-normal returns in order to provide an example of distributions that are not symmetric.
In this study we define risk as semi-deviation from a target and refer to it as downside risk for brevity. The concept of downside risk is not novel in finance. Markowitz (1959 Markowitz ( , 1991 argues that it is natural for an investor to prefer a low risk to the downside, instead of a low variance (upside and downside) of portfolio returns, but he also recognizes the computational challenges associated with the use of downside risk. We now turn to describing the methodology to decompose downside risk. The reader less interested in the full generality of our decomposition, and seeking a simple example of our methodology, may skip to Section 3.2.
The mathematics of the downside risk decomposition
In this section we illustrate the methodology for measuring the contribution of portfolio components to overall downside risk and how to interpret this decomposition. The downside risk is calculated relative to a minimal acceptable return level (M AR).
As Sharpe (2002) We proceed by developing a similar decomposition for downside risk. For a portfolio with returns R, the downside risk from the minimal accepted return M AR is defined as
In order to decompose downside risk, we assume that the portfolio return R is a combi-
Similar to the case of standard deviation or Value at Risk, it is shown in the Appendix that
The portfolio components in this decomposition of downside risk, however, are not addi- 
We observe that this decomposition is different from the typical Value at Risk or standard 
Combining equations (13) with (14), we obtain that:
This is nothing more than a decomposition of the total downside variance of the portfolio from the prespecified M AR. From equations (11)- (15) we observe the following: 
The righthandside of the above formula is easily interpreted as follows. First, note that the righthandside of equation (16) looks very similar to a covariation between the returns of the entire portfolio and the returns of particular components, where the "covariance" is calculated on the set on which the total portfolio does not meet the minimal acceptable return. To further elaborate on our intuition, we observe that on the set I we have M AR − R > 0. The sign of the term inside of the expectation on the righthandside of equation (16) Finally, we note that this decomposition relies on on the additivity of the returns of the portfolio components to the returns of the total portfolio. This naturally raises the question of whether this type of decomposition can be applied to portfolio of highly nonlinear strategies, for example such as those followed by certain hedge funds. To address this concern, we note that a similar decomposition is valid when P&L's (which are additive), instead of returns, are used.
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11 Such a decomposition is available from the authors upon request.
Risk Decomposition for the XYZ Fund
We continue by the decomposing the downside risk for the hypothetical fund XYZ described in Section 2.2. We assume that M AR = 5%.
The results of the downside risk decomposition -simultaneously across the investment decisions used to build the portfolio (the investment decision decomposition) as well as the individual securities held in the portfolio (the asset decomposition) − are presented in Panel B
of Table 3 . The largest contribution to portfolio returns is the tactical decision to overweight the Inflation Hedge asset class, while the largest contribution to risk comes from the asset allocation decision to invest 50% of the portfolio in U.S. Equity. The active decision to invest in Commodities as an inflation hedging asset has the negative effect of reducing the returns by 0.02% (see Panel A of Table 3 ) but at the same time increasing the downside risk by 1.6% (see Panel B of Table 3 ). All the external managers add returns to the portfolio while increasing the risk -and the benchmark employed for the sub-asset class of commodities. As a third of her her portfolio is invested in Commodities, which are considerably riskier than TIPS, the manager of the Inflation Hedging asset class generates a risk much higher risk than that of 12 The fact that active investing increases the risk is not automatic nor obvious. We modeled the fund XYZ in such a way. Our empirical results, however, document that active investing by U.S. Endowment funds in fact decreases overall portfolio risk.
her benchmark index. We would have not been able to arrive at this conclusion using the classical risk decomposition across asset classes.
Returns and Risk Decomposition of U.S. Endowments
In this section we apply the risk management methodology developed in the previous section to a sample of university and college endowment funds. Our goal is two-fold: one the one hand to identify the management decisions and assets that contribute the most to the risk that university endowments do not meet their payout obligations and preserve their capital, and on the other hand, whether our results change if the payout level is stressed. We start by describing the data. Assets" includes assets that are difficult to classify into any of the other broad asset classes.
Data
For a summary of how the weights to these asset classes change over time, as well as for a summary of endowment performance, we refer the reader to Brown et al.
(2008).
As performance (by which in this context we understand raw returns) is available at annual frequency, and the set of choices consists of 12 asset classes, we only include those institutions with at least 12 data points -that is, endowments which continuously reported for the period 1994 to 2005. Also we only include the endowments which report actual as well as policy asset allocations. These filters reduce our sample to 281 funds. The summary statistics of the 2005 target asset allocation weights, actual allocation weights and annual returns of these 281 institutions are presented in Table 4 .
In order to perform the return decomposition outlined in Section 2.2, it is necessary to specify passive benchmark indices that are representative of the NACUBO asset classes. In doing so, we were careful to select indices that are commonly used by the industry. Summary statistics on these passive indices are presented in Table 5 .
The level of granularity in the available data is such that we are unable to identify any internal investment implementation decisions or how these investments are evaluated.
Due to this limitation, we are unable to calculate the Benchmark Selection and the Active components of the portfolio separately for each asset class; however, in the next section we shall show that although these return attributions are unknown individually, their sum across all asset classes can in fact be computed.
Empirical Endowment Return Decomposition
Having outlined our data we can now describe the decomposition of endowment returns in our sample. In order to obtain the downside risk decomposition for an endowment we use the sample counterparts of the expectation terms in equations (11)- (15). 13 1. The Asset Allocation component As noted in Section 3.1 actual asset allocation weights are available in the data as well as target asset allocation weights (or equivalently policy weights). By combining these weights with the benchmark returns as formula (4) suggests we can calculate the contribution of each asset class allocation to overall endowment returns.
13 Assume that our sample consists of the returns (R t , R
T . An unbiased sample estimate for the downside risk from a fixed M AR is given by
This differs from the unbiased sample estimator for standard deviation, in the fact that we divide by T , and not by (T − 1) under the square root.
The Tactical Asset Allocation component As we have the actual allocation weights
and target weights for each endowment as well as the returns for each asset class representative index, we are able to compute the return contribution of each tactical decision to underor overweight an asset class as in formula (5).
3. The Benchmark selection component Unfortunately, data on how internal managers evaluate their investments are not available, thus it is impossible for us to calculate the effect of the internal decisions that apply to the selection of benchmarks.
The Active component As we do not have data on how various internal investment
are evaluated we cannot calculate the active contribution to overall portfolio returns.
However, from formula (8) (15), we calculate the relative contribution of the component i as the expectation of:
DR .
Thus, both returns and risk contributions will add up to 100%. Returns and risk contributions in the sense used here have been previously used, for example by Sharpe (2002).
Return and Risk Contributions: Results and Discussion
In this section we apply the results outlined in Section 2.2 and decompose the downside risk of each endowment. The first subsection analyzes the risk and return contributions of various asset classes and investment management decisions of university endowments, using their payout ratios plus inflation as target (or minimal acceptable return) for calculating their downside risk.
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The second subsection analyzed the sensitivity of risk contributions of various asset classes and management decisions with respect to the choice of the downside risk target.
Downside risk from inflation adjusted payout
In this subsection we use M AR = payout + inf lation as minimal acceptable return, where payout is the proportion of the endowment wealth paid in a given year and inf lation is the return on the University of Michigan Consumer Price Index. The results are presented in Table 6 .
As Table 4 shows, the dominant average asset class of an endowment portfolio is the U.S.
Equity, which has an average target weight of 43.31% and an actual average weight of 42.38%
. We would expect that U.S. Equity has the largest contribution to the return of an average endowment, as it generates a similar proportion of 43.64% of the return. What is surprising is its contribution to the overall downside risk of the portfolio: U.S. Equity generates 94% of the total downside risk. Even more surprising, despite generating less than 50% of the total endowment returns, Equity overall (U.S. and international) generates over 120% of the total downside risk (U.S. Equity generates about 94% of the total downside risk and Non-U.S.
Equity generates about 33% of the total downside risk). It requires the diversifying effect of other asset classes as well as tactical and active decisions to reduce risk to a total of 100%.
The next largest contributor to returns is the allocation to U.S. Fixed Income, which generates on average 15.96% of the average endowment's return. In contrast to the U.S. That is, Venture Capital is a significant generator of returns for certain endowments, as well as a major generator of risk. While the raw returns of investments in Venture Capital may be outstanding for a certain set of university endowment portfolios, our results do not support a similar role in portfolio risk reduction.
Tactical decisions do not appear to contribute significantly to either return or overall risk. One interesting result is that the tactical allocation to Venture Capital reduces returns (however, it also decreases downside risk). As a possible explanation, we note that the typical endowment fund is under-allocated to Venture Capital (as apparent from Table 4, where the target Venture Capital weight is on average 2.32%, while the actual weight is 1.26% on average). Among the causes of this chronic under-allocation to Venture Capital we cite slow deployment of committed capital, as well as the return of capital already allocated.
Unfortunately, data on actual capital commitments of endowment funds -as opposed to target asset allocation -are not available, limiting our ability to investigate any of the potential causes. The under-allocation to Venture Capital, however, exists and it is costly to endowments in terms of returns, while its absence makes the portfolio less risky.
One last result is that the active decisions made by endowments increase returns by 7.20% on average, while reducing the downside risk by 14.62%. The cause of this finding lies in the fact that the sum of the returns generated by the internal benchmark selection decisions and security selection is negatively correlated with the actual passive portfolios held by endowments. This finding supports the literature such as Cremers and Petajisto (2007) documenting that active investing creates value. natural to analyze risk contributions when the payout levels change. Additionally, we note that analyzing the sensitivity of our results to payout levels may help us extend our results to periods in which endowments experience negative performance. If we find that our results hold true at payout levels that are higher than the current ones, this is equivalent with the fact that our decomposition results hold true when returns are smaller while payouts remained unchanged.
Sensitivity of risk contributions with respect to payout levels
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In order to answer this question, we repeat the analysis performed in Subsection 4. Table 4 and increase as high as (an admittedly extreme) 11.90%. For brevity, instead of analyzing separately the downside risk contributions of all twelve asset 15 We thank one of the anonymous referees for this suggestion. The question of interest here is whether our results on the risk contribution of various asset classes and/or investment decisions remain true during periods of severe negative performance for endowments.
classes, we group them together in Equity (domestic and non-U.S.), Fixed Income (domestic and non-U.S.), Hedge Funds, Real Estate (Private and Public), Private Equity and Venture Capital (PE/VC) and Cash. As the overall risk contributions of the asset classes "Other"
and "Natural Resources" are insignificant we do not present the results for these asset classes.
We then increase (or decrease) the payout reported by each endowment by x and repeat the analysis of Subsection 4.3.1.
The risk contributions are presented in Figure 2 . First, we observe that as we vary the minimal acceptable return (M AR), the magnitude of the risk contributions vary widely.
For example, asset allocation to cash generates on average a negative risk contribution for low M AR levels, that is, if the required level of payout is not high, cash serves as a risk "diversifier" in the portfolio. However, as M AR increases, holding cash in the policy portfolio makes it unlikely that the payout is met; intuitively, then, an allocation to cash increases the risk of the portfolio. This is apparent in Figure 2 
Conclusions
In this study we have proposed a risk management system that decomposes the financial risk associated with a portfolio simultaneously across the management decisions used to build the portfolio as well as the individual securities held in the portfolio. This methodology of risk measurement is particularly useful to decentralized (or "top-down") investors, such as university endowments or pension plans.
The fundamental risk measure used in this study is downside risk from a prespecified minimal accepted return. This statistic is particularly useful for investors facing a liability. University endowments, which typically have a payout obligation to their beneficiary, represent such a particular type of investor.
We applied this newly developed risk measurement methodology to a sample of university endowments and analyzed the sources of returns and downside risk. Consistent with the fact that endowments invest most of their assets in U.S. Equity we found this asset class to generate most of the returns and most of the downside risk. In contrast, we found that U.S.
Fixed Income, while increasing returns, appears to also decrease downside risk.
Contrary to the common wisdom that alternative investments are risky investments, we found that some of these alternatives, namely hedge funds, contribute positively to returns while simultaneously decreasing downside risk. Thus hedge funds play a similar role to that traditionally attributed to U.S. Fixed Income in a university endowment portfolio. We also found that the active investment decisions made by endowments increase returns and reduce downside risk.
Although the risk management method we propose is based on downside risk, we stress that the choice of a primary risk statistic depends on each investor's unique characteristics.
The risk decomposition we propose, in particular, can be generalized to risk statistics that are of particular interest to the investor.
Appendix: Downside Risk Decomposition Mathematics
In this section we prove the downside risk decomposition formula. Let the whole portfolio N -uplets (w 1 , . .., w N ) whose sum is not necessarily one. Because
by differentiating with respect to λ then making λ = 1 we obtain the following downside risk decomposition
Recall that we denoted by I the subset of the probability space on which the returns of the entire portfolio R < M AR, and by
With this notation we have that:
Differentiating the above relationship with respect to M AR we obtain that:
Substituting the formula for
into the decomposition of downside risk we obtain that
In order to see the interpretation of our downside risk decomposition formula, note that by differentiating the definition of the downside risk with respect with w i we obtain that:
Substituting this formula into equation (13) we obtain that: (4) to (8), using a M AR = payout + inflation. The inflation component is the annual CPI. We then divide the returns of each component of formulae (4) to (8) by the overall portfolio returns while summing R B and R A together. All the contributions to the portfolio returns add up to 100%. We do the same thing to downside risk, with the distinction that formula (12) is used together with formulae (4) to (8) to decompose the overall downside risk of the portfolio.
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